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Authoritarian Resilience and Regime Cohesion in Morocco after 
the Arab Spring 
 
Abstract 
This article argues that Morocco’s competitive authoritarian 
regime is more resilient today in certain key respects than it 
was when the Arab Spring began. Drawing on Levitsky and Way’s 
dimension of organisational power, the paper contends the regime 
was sufficiently unnerved by the unrest to resort to the use of 
high intensity coercion as part of its response to 20 February 
Movement. The article maintains that, in employing this force 
successfully, the regime has turned the protests into an 
important source of non-material cohesion for its security 
apparatus and thereby enhanced its ability to defend itself from 
similar challenges in the future. 
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Introduction 
The aim of this article is to analyse the impact of the Arab 
Spring on the cohesion of Morocco’s security apparatus and the 
resilience of its competitive authoritarian order.1 The paper 
argues that the unprecedented size and intensity of the 
protests, along with the extraordinary regional context in which 
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they occurred, convinced the regime that its grip on power was 
under threat. This fear led it to authorise its security forces 
to use high intensity coercion to break-up demonstrations and 
intimidate protestors. These forces used violence to disperse a 
number of rallies and marches held in various locations 
throughout the spring and summer of 2011. Coercion, therefore, 
quickly became part of the regime’s multi-faceted response to 
the unrest. 
The article draws on Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way’s 
dimension of organisational power to argue that the Moroccan 
regime’s interpretation of the protests as a potentially 
revolutionary moment, coupled with its successful use of high 
intensity coercion, has established the Arab Spring as an 
important new source of non-material cohesion for the country’s 
security forces that has not only enhanced their ability to deal 
with any similar demonstrations in the future, but also 
reinforced their commitment to defend the country’s existing 
competitive authoritarian order. In responding to and surviving 
the Arab Spring in the ways that it did, the regime has augmented 
its capacity to withstand any similar protests for however long 
this cohesion endures.2 
The article defines the Moroccan regime as the makhzen. The 
term originally meant ‘storehouse’, but now ‘refers to “the 
apparatus of power, constituted as a chain from the sovereign 
who receives his power from God and passing without interruption 
down through the ministers, governors, and local authorities … 
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to the doorman”’.3 Thus, the ‘makhzen is “the place where power 
is concentrated and the resources used to exercise it are 
concentrated”’.4 It refers, therefore, to ‘the palace and its 
[formal and customary] clients’ who, together, not only ‘dictate 
the main lines of policy’ but also ‘act as a gatekeeper for any 
kind of political reform’.5 
In advancing this argument, the article makes a series of 
important and original contributions. The first is on the 
survival and ongoing resilience of Morocco’s authoritarian 
regime. The article demonstrates that the Arab Spring, far from 
weakening the regime, has enhanced its hardiness in at least one 
important respect. In making this point, the article confirms 
Sean Yom and Gregory Gause’s observation that regimes that 
‘survive[] close calls with destruction’ often do so ‘not 
because they have never faced such threats in the first place’, 
but because they have done so successfully in the past.6 The 
second is on the rehabilitation of the authoritarian resilience 
paradigm. By drawing on Levitsky and Way’s dimension of 
organisational power, the article highlights and utilises a 
thesis that has not been used in this way in this context before, 
and seeks to challenge the sorts of assumption that resulted in 
so many scholars being caught off guard. The third is on what 
constitutes a revolutionary experience. By charting and 
examining how the protests have become a source of non-material 
cohesion, the article adds depth to this aspect of Levitsky and 
Way’s thesis. And the fourth is on how established regimes try 
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to protect themselves. By examining the impact of wider societal 
pressures on the resilience of Morocco’s regime, the article 
counter-balances a tendency within the ‘coup-proofing’ 
literature to focus on ‘endogenous factors’, on how incumbents 
remodel their security forces and the effectiveness of their 
efforts to do so.7 
To sustain this analysis and argument, the article is 
divided into three main parts. The first gives an overview of 
Levitsky and Way’s model, paying particular attention to their 
notions of competitive authoritarianism, organisational power, 
and coercive strength and cohesion. The second then briefly 
applies their thesis to Morocco and explains how and why the 
kingdom remains competitive authoritarian. And the third extends 
this analysis by detailing how the regime’s response to the Arab 
Spring has turned the protests into a source of non-material 
cohesion for the security forces. 
 
Levitsky and Way’s key concepts 
Levitsky and Way were moved to develop their model by their 
dissatisfaction with existing explanations of regime transition 
during the so-called Third Wave of democratisation. They argued 
that too many of these accounts contained at least one of two 
important omissions. The first is born of a false assumption: 
that hybrid regimes are destined to liberalise because they 
display some democratic tendencies.8 Levitsky and Way contend 
that hybridity is not a stage in a linear process, but a state 
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in which regimes can remain for prolonged periods of time. And 
the second is the under-examination of ‘relations between the 
international environment and regime change’.9 
Levitsky and Way also reject all existing descriptions of 
hybrid regimes on the grounds that ‘competitive authoritarianism 
is a new phenomenon’.10 They maintain that labels such as 
electoral-, illiberal-, defective-, managed- and quasi-
democracy place too much emphasis on democratic structures and 
processes.11 Conversely, they argue that categorisations like 
post-totalitarianism and bureaucratic authoritarianism do not 
permit enough competition.12 And while they acknowledge that 
terms such as electoral authoritarianism and semi-
authoritarianism better describe the types of regime to which 
they are referring, they contend that these descriptions fail 
to distinguish between ‘competitive and hegemonic’ authoritarian 
rule and are therefore too broad.13 Thus, they devise and adopt 
a new label: competitive authoritarian. 
Competitive authoritarian regimes are different from full 
dictatorships as ‘constitutional channels exist [within them] 
through which opposition groups [can] compete in a meaningful 
way for executive power’. ‘Elections are held regularly’ and 
‘opposition activity is above ground’. This means that rival 
parties can ‘open offices, recruit candidates, and organize 
campaigns’, and that their leaders ‘are rarely exiled or 
imprisoned’. Nevertheless, these regimes are not fully 
democratic because ‘incumbent abuse of the state violates at 
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least one of three defining attributes of democracy: (1) free 
elections, (2) broad protection of civil liberties, and (3) a 
reasonably level playing field’.14 
These various discontents inform the structure, focus and 
purpose of Levitsky and Way’s model. Its primary functions are 
to explain the sharp rise in the number of competitive 
authoritarian regimes in the world from the early 1990s onwards, 
and to identify and order the critical factors that shape and 
direct their political evolution. Accordingly, it places more 
emphasis on the changes that have taken place in the 
international system as a result of the end of the Cold War than 
most other frameworks.15 One of the developments it focuses most 
heavily on is the establishment of the West as the world’s 
‘dominant center of economic and military power’.16 It identifies 
this outcome as especially important on the grounds that it both 
marked and hastened the ideational and material decline of 
authoritarianism. With the Soviet Union’s demise, Western 
governments felt freer to call for the reform of dictatorial 
regimes. And with much of the world’s remaining development 
resources concentrated in their hands, their ability to press 
their demands was enhanced.17 
The United States and European Union, therefore, are 
accorded central roles in Levitsky and Way’s model. They are 
presented as bastions of democracy, and as the most important 
proponents and agents of political liberalisation around the 
world. Proximity to their borders and shared pasts with them – 
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even if born of imperial conquest or military occupation – both 
facilitate and stimulate democratisation. Their centrality to 
the model, along with the ways in which their influence on a 
country can be traced and measured, are captured and detailed 
by the dimensions of linkage and leverage. Thus, two of the 
framework’s three parts (the other is organisational power) 
focus on the international, on the actions of powerful foreign 
governments and institutions in the aftermath of a seismic 
upheaval in the global system. 
Linkage denotes the ‘density of ties (economic, political, 
diplomatic, social, and organizational) and cross-border flows 
(of capital, goods and services, people and information) among 
particular countries and the United States, the EU … and Western 
dominated multilateral institutions’.18 Leverage refers to a 
regime’s ‘ability to avoid [and cope with] Western action aimed 
at punishing abuse or encouraging political liberalization’.19 
An important determinant of a regime’s capacity to withstand 
such pressure is whether it has the backing of a Black Knight 
patron, a militarily or economically powerful state that wants 
to limit or to counter the West’s influence or attempts to spread 
democracy.20 Finally, organisational power encompasses the 
‘scope and cohesion of [a regime’s] state and governing-party 
structures’.21 
This structural weighting is reinforced by the order in 
which Levitsky and Way’s thesis unfolds. They grade the West’s 
or the regime’s capacity under each dimension high, medium or 
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low. These classifications are determined by assessing a 
country/regime against sets of pre-determined criteria.22 When 
linkage is high democratisation is probable because the 
‘extensive penetration by international media, transnational 
human-rights networks, and multilateral organizations’ of the 
target country ensure that ‘even minor abuses [perpetrated by 
its regime] are likely to trigger responses’ from either the US 
and/or the EU.23 Linkage should also have a ‘democratizing effect 
even where organizational power is high’ as long as leverage is 
high. But when the West’s leverage over a regime is low ‘even 
relatively weak incumbents are likely to survive, for they will 
encounter limited external democratizing pressure’.24 
A regime’s organisational power is based on the scope and 
cohesion of its ruling party and coercive apparatus, and to a 
lesser extent the amount of discretionary control it exercises 
over the national economy. Scope is determined by the breadth 
and depth of the party’s and apparatus’s presence in the country, 
their respective abilities to operate effectively across the 
national territory and at very local levels (‘village and/or 
neighborhood’).25 Cohesion is decided by material and ideational 
factors, the amount of financial and other support provided by 
the regime, and the extent to which the party’s and apparatus’s 
members and leaders share a common ethnicity or ideology (in a 
society in which such bonds and beliefs matter), or a ‘military 
conflict’ (such as actively participating in a successful war, 
revolution or anti-colonial struggle).26 Crucially, ‘cohesion 
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tends to be greater when it is rooted in nonmaterial ties’ and 
‘bonds of solidarity forged out of periods of violent struggle 
are perhaps the most robust’ of all.27 
Levitsky and Way argue that the ‘coercive capacity’ of 
authoritarian regimes – both competitive and hegemonic – is 
vital to their ongoing stability and longer-term endurance.28 
They contend that the regimes that are most likely to survive, 
are those best able ‘to either prevent or crack down on 
opposition’ protests.29 They go on to identify two broad types 
of coercion: low and high intensity. The former can take ‘myriad 
forms’ including surveillance, ‘low-profile physical 
harassment, or localized attacks on opposition activists and 
supporters’. It can also take ‘non-physical forms’ such as the 
withholding of ‘employment, scholarships, or university entrance 
to opposition activists; the deprivation of ‘public services … 
to individuals and communities with ties’ to political rivals; 
and the ‘use of tax, regulatory, or other state agencies to 
investigate and prosecute opposition politicians, 
entrepreneurs, and media owners’.30 While low intensity coercion 
is important to competitive authoritarian regimes such acts ‘do 
not involve high-profile targets and thus rarely make headlines 
or trigger international condemnation’.31 In contrast, high 
intensity coercion comprises ‘highly-visible acts that target 




According to Levitsky and Way, high intensity coercion both 
relies upon and helps generate strong cohesion within a security 
apparatus, and between that apparatus and the regime it serves. 
High intensity coercion helps engender cohesion by binding the 
fate of those carrying out the repression to the regime on whose 
behalf they are acting. For such is the domestic and 
international exposure of these individuals that if they fail 
‘and the regime collapses, they will be vulnerable to 
retribution’.33 And high intensity coercion can help enhance 
cohesion by manufacturing an experience that has been ‘forged 
in a context of violent struggle’ that binds those involved 
together.34 
Levitsky and Way do not specify, however, which types of 
struggle or what level of violence generate the greatest number 
of or strongest non-material ties. Nor do they set any limit 
beyond ‘recent’ on how long these experiences remain effective, 
can produce and sustain such bonds.35 Way establishes a broad 
timeframe with his observation that the Communist regimes ‘that 
outlasted the end of the Cold War – China, Cuba, Laos, North 
Korea, Vietnam – were all led by veterans of revolutionary 
struggles’.36 On this basis, the amount of time that elapses once 
a war, revolution or anti-colonial campaign is over is of 
secondary importance. For what matters are the personnel, 
whether power continues to be held by men and women with direct 
and personal experience of that struggle. Recent, therefore, can 




Morocco: linkage, leverage and organisational power 
Ostensibly, Morocco is a difficult country to which to apply 
Levitsky and Way’s model. They reject the kingdom as a possible 
case study for their own 2010 book on the grounds that its ‘most 
important executive office is not elected’ and, as such, 
‘generates a distinct set of dynamics and challenges not found 
under competitive authoritarianism.’37 They do not, however, 
insist that their model can never be applied to the country. And 
while the king might not have to submit to the vote to retain 
his position, neither he nor the institution of the monarchy is 
disinterested in, or unaffected by, elections.38 Indeed, the 
occurrence, conduct and outcomes of these ballots matter deeply 
to him and to the throne’s ongoing position within Moroccan 
politics. For this reason, therefore, the article contends that 
Levitsky and Way’s model can, and should, be applied to the 
country.39 
Morocco first made the transition from full to competitive 
authoritarianism in the late 1990s when, in accordance with King 
Hassan’s doctrine of alternance, the regime began holding 
regular, and partially free and fair multi-party elections. It 
has remained in this governance condition ever since, emerging 
from the Arab Spring scarcely any more democratic – and not 
really any more authoritarian – than it was when the protests 
began. Despite the constitutional, and other political, reforms 
the regime introduced in response to the unrest, most meaningful 
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authority is still invested in the same institutions as before, 
most notably, the monarchy. And while the king is bound more 
tightly by election results than previously and is now obliged 
to consult with his prime minister on a wider range of issues,40 
he retains decisive control over many of the country’s key 
political institutions. Not only does he preside over the 
Council of Ministers, the Superior Council of the Judiciary, the 
Superior Council of the Ulema, the Superior Council of Security 
and the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces, but he is Commander of the 
Faithful and appoints the president, and half the members of, 
the Constitutional Court.41 He is an executive, rather than 
constitutional, monarch.42 Thus, the kingdom conforms to two of 
Levitsky and Way’s foundational observations: that not every 
country that liberalises its political system becomes fully 
democratic; and regimes can remain in this hybrid, competitive 
authoritarian state for many years at a time. 
The European Union has high linkage to Morocco across all 
six sub-dimensions of connection.43 The kingdom has joined each 
of the EU’s policy frameworks for the region at the earliest 
opportunity and is the only North African country to be granted 
Advanced Status by Brussels.44 It conducts more trade with the 
bloc than the rest of the world put together while the 
remittances from its expatriates – 84 percent of whom live in 
Europe – were worth an average of $6.76 billion a year between 
2010 and 2013.45 Its students have long comprised the largest 
overseas contingent in France’s universities,46 and over half of 
13 
 
the members (56 percent) of the current government studied in 
either Europe or North America.47 Millions of its citizens live 
in the EU,48 and thousands of Europeans regularly holiday in the 
kingdom.49 57.1 percent of its citizens have access to the 
internet and a remarkable 126.9 percent own mobile phones.50 And 
a wide range of trans-Mediterranean civil society groups are 
active within in its borders, including the important Euro-
Mediterranean Human Rights Network (Réseau Euro-Méditerranéen 
des Droits de l’Homme, EMDH).51 
Despite the range and strength of these ties, the EU’s 
leverage over Morocco is still only low because the country has 
a large economy ($100.6 billion, 2015).52 Furthermore, the 
European Union and the wider West have long shown little desire 
to discipline the Moroccan regime into changing its political 
behaviour. Thus, the kingdom’s organisational power holds the 
key to whether it is susceptible to whatever democratising 
pressure Brussels is willing and able to put on it.  
Morocco’s organisational power is high primarily because 
it has a large and capable security apparatus which offsets the 
absence of a dominant ruling party. Unlike other competitive 
authoritarian orders, most notably Ben Ali’s Tunisia, the 
Moroccan regime has never relied on a single party to dominate 
and control the political process. On the contrary, the makhzen 
continues to cultivate and co-opt several parties at once so as 
never to depend entirely on any one of them to exercise its will 
and pursue its interests. Since the introduction of alternance, 
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the Istiqlal (Hizb al-Istiqlal/Parti d’Independence), 
Authenticity and Modernity Party (Parti Authenticité et 
Modernité, PAM), National Rally of Independents (Rassemblement 
National des Indépendents, RNI), the Popular Movement (Mouvement 
Populaire, MP), Constitutional Union (Union Constitutionelle, 
UC) and even the Justice and Development Party (Parti de la 
Justice et du Développement, PJD) have all received help and 
encouragement from the regime, but never to the extent that any 
one of them has been able to achieve absolute preponderance over 
all the others or emerge as a rival locus of power to the 
makhzen.  
To weaken the popularity and decrease the potential 
influence on the monarchy of the largest parties still further, 
including those that had sworn and demonstrated their loyalty 
to the palace, both King Hassan II and King Mohammed VI permitted 
and encouraged the establishment of several new political 
groups. In addition to drawing off votes and support from 
everyone else, many of these new bodies broke away from existing 
parties. Some of those to do so were the Democratic and Social 
Movement (Mouvement Démocratique et Social, MDS) which split 
from the National Popular Movement (Mouvement National 
Populaire, MNP) in 1996, the Socialist Democratic Party (Parti 
Socialiste Démocratique, PSD) which left the Organisation of 
Democratic and Popular Action (Organisation de l’Action 
Démocratique et Populaire, OADP) in 1997, the Reform and 
Development Party (Parti de la Reforme et Développement, PRD) 
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which broke from the RNI in 1997, and the Moroccan Union for 
Democracy (Union Marocaine pour la Démocratie, MD) which parted 
from the UC in 2006.53 The creation of these new parties weakened 
those out of which they emerged. Some, such as the MNP, were 
founded precisely for this purpose by figures with strong ties 
to the palace. 
Prior to the Arab Spring, the king’s ability to play the 
country’s leading political parties off against each another was 
further enhanced by his constitutional right to offer the 
premiership to whomever he chose rather than to the leader of 
the party that won the most votes in a general election. In the 
constitution introduced in 2011 in response to the protests, 
this right has been ended. Nevertheless, the king retains many 
significant powers and has given no indication of refraining 
from pitting the parties against one another.  
Morocco’s security apparatus has had high scope since 
before the Arab Spring began. It has penetrated society to the 
level of the village and the neighbourhood across the whole 
country. The depth and extent of its presence is in response to 
the various serious challenges the regime continues to face. 
These include resisting Polisario in the Western Sahara, 
policing and countering Islamist extremists and terrorists in 
the main urban centres, and monitoring and containing dissent 
in regions that have long resisted and agitated against Rabat’s 
authority like the Rif Valley. The Moroccan regime has always 
spent heavily, therefore, on its armed forces. Between 2003 and 
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2013, its per capita investment in its military increased year 
on year so that by the end of this period it was spending over 
twice as much per head of population than it was a decade 
earlier. This sustained expenditure helped ensure that these 
forces had both high scope and high material cohesion by the 
time the Arab Spring began.  
In response to the protests, the regime increased its 
defence spending by even greater margins. In 2011, the year in 
which the Arab Spring first began in Morocco, it spent $101.7 
per head of population on its armed forces. In 2012, it increased 
this amount to $102.1 before committing $120.2 in 2013 and $118.0 
in 2014.54 These raises meant that defence spending formed a 
greater portion of the government’s total annual expenditure 
than ever before. In both 2011 and 2012, 9.8 percent of 
government outlay went on the armed forces whereas in 2013 and 
2014 11.6 percent and 11.2 percent did.55 And this trend of 
committing a greater portion of the national budget to the 
military has continued with 10.7 percent of total government 
disbursements going on defence in 2017. In the same year, the 
Tunisian, Egyptian and French governments, by comparison, 
dedicated 6.9 percent, 4.6 percent and 4.0 percent of their 
total annual expenditure to their armed forces.56 The regime’s 
sustained investment in its armed forces means that they are 
able to maintain high scope and high material cohesion in 
addition to the high non-material cohesion that the experience 
of successfully resisting the Arab Spring protestors has given 
17 
 
them. Thus, the regime does not miss the Black Knight patron it 
does not have. 
 
The Moroccan regime, the Arab Spring and non-material cohesion 
The apparent seriousness of the Arab Spring protests in Morocco 
was determined by a range of domestic and international factors 
including the size of the demonstrations, the composition of 20 
February Movement, the broader regional context in which they 
took place and the West’s reaction to them. The protests began 
on 20 February 2011 when between 150,000 and 200,000 people took 
to the streets in 53 cities.57 Even though these were not the 
first serious demonstrations ever staged in Morocco and their 
size was contested by the organisers and the regime,58 they still 
involved tens of thousands of people making them the largest 
held in the country since independence.  
This opening burst of unrest was arguably the highpoint of 
the Arab Spring in Morocco. The momentum surrounding the initial 
demonstrations was maintained over the next few weeks largely 
by the anger with which the public greeted the regime’s heavy-
handed treatment of some protestors and various opposition 
groups.59 Yet after King Mohammed’s speech of 9 March, the 
movement went into slow, but inexorable decline. What rallies 
it organised from that point on not only took place with growing 
irregularity, but were attended by ever fewer people 
representing an increasingly narrow cross section of society.60 
It failed ‘to rouse the masses’ and, thus, ‘hit a ceiling’ of 
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what it was likely to achieve ‘within months of the first 
demonstration’ being held.61 
Yet the scale and significance of 20 February Movement’s 
shortcomings were not immediately apparent. Indeed, its failure 
to motivate the masses and sustain, let alone escalate, its 
campaign was due in no small measure to the speed and focus of 
the regime’s response. ‘Mohammed quickly realized that the 
protests posed a potentially serious test to his rule and placed 
himself at the forefront of reform, taking the momentum away 
from the opposition’.62 By announcing the creation of a Royal 
Commission to review the country’s constitution in his speech 
of 9 March 2011, the king not only sought to assuage at least 
some of the demands being made by 20 February Movement, but to 
shift ‘the public debate away from the grievances on the street 
to the … reforms that might be on the cards’ and thereby restore 
‘the monarchy and the parties’ to the heart of the political 
process.63 The threat to the established order posed by the 
demonstrations, therefore, was curtailed in part by the king’s 
timely and well-pitched intervention. 
 His adroit handling of the situation, however, spoke of the 
extent of his concern. While his actions may have helped hobble 
20 February Movement, they were nevertheless motivated by a very 
real fear of what might happen if the organisation was permitted 
to continue unchecked. The fleetness of his response along with 
the breadth and seeming significance of what he appeared to be 
offering betrayed the scale of his misgivings. He set out to 
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capture the initiative and marginalise the movement not because 
he thought it was weak and failing, but because of what he feared 
it might become and potentially achieve. 
 King Mohammed’s concerns were born, to a significant 
extent, of events elsewhere in the region.64 While the regime 
had known unrest before, it had never previously been confronted 
by protests that were so ‘clearly informed’ by what was taking 
place in neighbouring countries.65 Neither the February protests 
nor the body that organised them transpired or operated in a 
historical-political vacuum. They were each local expressions 
of a discontent that was not only transnational, but had, by the 
time the first demonstrations were held in Morocco, driven 
Tunisia’s president of 23 years into exile, plunged Egypt into 
the intense unrest that was to lead to Mubarak’s overthrow, and 
triggered the start of the violence that was to turn into the 
Libyan civil war. The Moroccan demonstrations and 20 February 
Movement, therefore, were inextricably linked to this broader 
context, features of which, were deeply troubling to the king 
and the regime. 
 And their fears were heightened still further by the make-
up of the protest movement itself. Ostensibly, ‘Morocco was 
distinct from other cases during the Arab Spring’ as the 
organisers of the demonstrations ‘never escalat[ed] to the use 
of violent tactics’.66 Indeed, on no occasion did 20 February 
Movement either call upon or overtly encourage its followers to 
physically attack or take up arms against the state. 
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Furthermore, its ‘long list of demands’ did not include ‘the 
removal of … King Mohammed …, only a limit on his royal powers’.67 
Throughout the Arab Spring, therefore, 20 February Movement 
refrained from either advocating violence or advancing an agenda 
that was so revolutionary in what it sought to achieve that the 
use of force was an inevitable corollary.  
 Yet not all of 20 February Movement’s partners and fellow 
travellers shared these goals. ‘Although moderate, secular youth 
helped propel … [the protests] initially, leftist parties and 
Islamists filled out the ranks of the movement as it 
mushroomed’.68 And one of the groups that came to play an active 
role in the orchestration and management of the demonstrations 
was the Justice and Charity association (Justice et 
Bienfaisance/Al-Adl Wal-Ihsan, AWI).69 Established by Sheikh 
Abdessalam Yassine in 1987, and headed since his death in 2012 
by Mohammed Abbadi, it ‘is a powerful political and social player 
that attempts to bring about political change through social 
activism’.70 And one of its most important and enduring 
objectives is to bring about the ‘weakening or abolition’ of the 
monarchy.71 Its tenacious commitment to this goal accounts for 
the regime’s continued refusal to grant it official party 
status. Furthermore, its involvement in the protests encouraged 
the regime to view 20 February Movement with greater wariness. 
In the eyes of the authorities, therefore, the Movement was 
tainted by association. 
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 In addition to encouraging the regime to question and doubt 
20 February Movement’s goals and motivations, the AWI’s 
involvement in the protests allowed the authorities to link the 
movement to other more extreme groups and bodies. In so doing, 
it was able to exploit a fear that it had long inculcated in the 
Moroccan public: that the main instigators and beneficiaries of 
any serious instability that might develop, of the type that was 
rapidly taking hold in Egypt and Libya, would be Islamist terror 
groups and other violent factions. Popular concern over the 
likelihood and possible consequences of greater unrest in the 
country were heightened still further by the suicide attack on 
a popular tourist café in Marrakech on 28 April 2011.72 For many 
Moroccans, this bombing seemed to confirm their worst fears: 
that the tide of violence that they had seen engulf other parts 
of the region was gradually rising in their own country. 
By means of the state-run media, the regime assiduously 
cultivated this fear by linking 20 February Movement to an 
incongruous range of armed outfits. In addition to ‘extreme 
Islamists and leftists bent on destabilizing the country’, the 
organisation was accused of receiving help and support from both 
Polisario and its main backer, the Algerian regime.73 
Notwithstanding the deep ideological and political divisions 
between some of these parties – which made their alleged 
convergence on this single organisation all the more unlikely – 
the Movement was charged with fraternising with nearly all of 
Morocco’s most dangerous enemies. That the regime went to such 
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lengths to discredit and damage 20 February Movement provides 
further confirmation of just how fearful it was of the protests. 
Not because it necessarily believed all the accusations that it 
levelled against the Movement, but because it felt that it had 
to make these claims in the first place. It tried and succeeded 
in presenting the Movement not so much as a threat to the regime, 
but to the safety and integrity of the country’s citizens and 
territory. In this way, it turned its enemies into those of 
Morocco and bound its survival to that of the entire country. 
 Just as the regime’s fears were shaped by what was taking 
place elsewhere in the region, so its response to the protests 
was conditioned by broader international factors. It noted the 
very different reactions of France, the United States and other 
key Western actors towards Ben Ali and Gadhafi.74 NATO’s 
intervention in Libya helped persuade it to moderate its use of 
force against 20 February Movement, not to pursue its opponents 
with quite the same vengeful vehemence with which Gadhafi was 
pursing his rivals.75 Simultaneously, however, France’s decision 
not to press for regime change in Tunisia helped reassure it 
that it might not suffer the same fate as Libya.76 Its concerns 
were further allayed when, in response to King Mohammed’s speech 
of 9 March, President Sarkozy praised the makhzen’s ‘deft 
management of the situation’ and development of ‘a much-needed 
“third way” to handling demands for political change’.77 Thus, 
‘at the height of the Moroccan protests’ Western governments put 
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no additional pressure on Rabat to introduce democratic 
reforms.78 
 From early on in the Arab Spring, therefore, the regime was 
emboldened and empowered by the West to continue following its 
current course of action, which included using high intensity 
coercion against the protestors. And while NATO’s military 
intervention in Libya suggested a greater willingness on the 
part of Western governments to oppose and depose authoritarian 
regimes in the region than in the recent past, its non-
involvement in Tunisia and Egypt confirmed the limits of its 
appetite to force through political change. Furthermore, its 
commitment to ousting Gadhafi arguably made it less likely to 
intervene elsewhere in North Africa given the additional forces 
that it would have had to have generated to conduct such 
operations and the extra instability and insecurity that these 
actions would have created in the region in the short term at 
least.  
 Even though the West’s sympathetic treatment of Morocco 
encouraged the regime to use high intensity coercion, it did not 
dispel the concern felt by many members of the ruling elite that 
the protests posed a significant threat to their grip on power. 
The regime’s attempts to neutralise 20 February Movement took 
many forms including appropriating parts of its agenda, trying 
to lure away its supporters, smearing its leaders, and making 
‘minor concessions masked as major reforms’.79 The regime also 
made judicious use of repression,80 ‘carefully calibrat[ing] the 
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actions of … [the country’s] coercive agencies to avoid the 
clumsy overreaction of some other rulers in the region’.81 
Indeed, violence formed a central strand of its response from 
the outset. And what caution it exercised, was primarily due to 
its desire to avoid making the situation worse by giving the 
demonstrators another reason to take to the streets.  
 High intensity coercion was mainly used by the security 
forces,82 and the ‘pro-government thugs’ who sometimes supported 
them,83 to break-up demonstrations and punish and intimidate 
protestors. Such violence was not practiced constantly for the 
duration of the Arab Spring, but in bursts mostly between late 
February and late March, early May and mid-June, and mid-July 
and early August 2011.84 The security forces’ response to the 
demonstrations in Casablanca on 13 March was especially savage 
and resulted in more than 20 protestors sustaining serious 
injuries including ‘broken arms … [and] head wounds’.85 And their 
reaction to the demonstrations in Agadir, Casablanca, Tangiers 
and elsewhere on 22 May was perhaps even more ferocious and led 
to many protestors suffering ‘life-threatening injuries’.86 
Then, on 30 May, security personnel in the city of Safi beat 
Kamal Ammari so severely that he died from his wounds three days 
later.87 He was the first protestor to be killed by the country’s 
security forces during the Arab Spring. His death helped breathe 
new life into 20 February Movement and led to more than 60,000 
people taking to the streets on 5 June 2011.88 
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 Notwithstanding this brief upsurge, the security forces’ 
effective use of high intensity coercion as part of a nationwide 
crackdown on the Arab Spring protests not only confirmed the 
extent of their scope, but also gave them a new source of non-
material cohesion. The regime’s fear that it was under threat 
from 20 February Movement imbued the demonstrations – in its 
eyes at least – with revolutionary potential. The regime’s 
subsequent empowerment of the security forces to use violence 
to break up the protests and to try to weaken the Movement was 
a risk-laden decision that could, as Ammari’s death showed, make 
its situation worse. The security forces’ ultimately successful 
navigation of these risks and nullification of the 
demonstrations’ revolutionary potential by means of high 
intensity coercion, therefore, has established the protests as 
a source of non-material solidarity for these forces and the 
regime.89 This is not to suggest that the other aspects of the 
regime’s response to the protests were unimportant, that they 
did not help Rabat deal with the challenge confronting it. 
Rather, that the regime’s selective and successful use of high 
intensity coercion was a key facet of its response and has 
strengthened its ability to contend with similar situations in 
the future.  
 
Conclusion 
This article has argued that the Arab Spring, far from weakening 
Morocco’s competitive authoritarian regime, has helped 
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strengthen it in at least one important way: by enhancing the 
non-material cohesion of the country’s security apparatus and 
regime. Drawing on Levitsky and Way’s dimension of 
organisational power, the article has shown that the Moroccan 
regime credited the protests with sufficient revolutionary 
potential to necessitate the use of high intensity coercion. In 
wielding this type of force successfully, the security apparatus 
transformed the Arab Spring into an important new source of non-
material solidarity that is helping to fortify its own cohesion 
and ties to the regime. 
This argument has three main parts. The first is the 
regime’s alarm, the strength of its fear of what the protests 
and 20 February Movement represented, the danger that they posed 
to its configuration and continued grip on power. The regime’s 
anxiety was born of perception, of how it viewed and construed 
the demonstrations. More specifically, the primary causes of its 
concerns were the Movement’s composition and actions beyond what 
the organisation’s leadership said and claimed. Similarly, the 
scale of the regime’s fear was betrayed by its reaction to the 
unrest including its use of high intensity coercion. So even 
though the Movement did not call for the abolition of the 
monarchy, its early size and dynamism, collaboration with groups 
and bodies that did want to remove the king from power and clear 
association with events elsewhere in the region, meant that the 




The second part of the argument is the regime’s use of 
force, its resort to high intensity coercion to disperse 
demonstrations and weaken 20 February Movement. That it did so, 
imbued the protests with sufficient revolutionary potential to 
turn them into a source of non-material cohesion for the security 
forces and regime. In making this point, the article extends 
Levitsky and Way’s original thesis in at least two important 
ways: by completing the relationship between coercion and 
cohesion, and by adding detail to what can constitute a source 
of non-material solidarity. More specially, the article shows 
that the Moroccan regime’s use of high intensity coercion 
provided evidence of the extent of the security forces’ scope 
and cohesion which were then strengthened further by the 
experience of dealing with the protests. 
And the third part of the argument is the regime’s success, 
its effective use of high intensity coercion to help nullify and 
counteract the protests and 20 February Movement. These outcomes 
are critical to the transformation of the demonstrations into a 
source of non-material cohesion, to turning the unrest into a 
powerful collective memory that helps bind the members of the 
security apparatus to each other and to the regime they were 
defending. For if they had failed, not only could there have 
been less of the existing regime to protect, but their experience 
of the Arab Spring would have been negative not positive. And 
as such, it would scarcely serve as an empowering and instructive 
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reminiscence of what had been accomplished and could be done 
again if necessary. 
In making this argument, the article has not only cast new 
light on Morocco’s political development since the Arab Spring, 
but also made an important intervention in the process of 
‘rethinking’ that scholars are engaged in following their 
collective failure to anticipate the start, spread and 
consequences of these protests.90 Furthermore, it has employed a 
thesis and a framework that has the subtlety and nuance to help 
prevent specialists from succumbing to the sort of tunnel vision 
that so impaired their analyses in the years leading up to the 
start of the demonstrations. Finally, it has also contributed 
to the so-called coup-proofing literature by considering the 
interplay of endogenous and exogenous factors in ensuring regime 
survival. 
 
1 For the purposes of this article, Morocco’s security apparatus includes: 
the Royal Moroccan Army (Armée Royale, AR), the Royal Guard (Garde Royale 
Marocaine, GRM), the Royal Moroccan Air Force (Forces Royales Air, FRA), the 
Royal Moroccan Navy (Marine Royale, MR), the Royal Moroccan Gendarmerie 
(Gendarmerie Royale Marocaine GRM), the Moroccan Auxiliary Forces (Forces 
Auxiliaires Marocaines, FAM) the State Police (Direction Générale de la 
Sûreté Nationale, DGSN), and the General Directorate for Territorial 
Surveillance (Direction Générale de la Surveillance du Territoire, DGST). 
The AR, GRM, FRA, MR and GRM fall under the authority of the Ministry of the 
Defence, while the FAM, DGSN and DGST come under that of the Ministry of the 
Interior. 
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